article
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to analyze code changes and search for interaction history.
- Evidence:
references/shared/change-analysis.mdinstructs the agent to rungit status,git diff, andgit logto scope changes. - Evidence:
references/shared/prompt-recovery.mdutilizesgrep,head,sqlite3, andghto find and peak into history files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to locate and read sensitive agent interaction history from numerous application directories.
- Evidence:
references/shared/prompt-recovery.mdsearches through directories such as~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions,~/.continue/sessions,~/.gemini/tmp, and VS Code global storage paths. - Evidence: It attempts to query local SQLite databases (
state.vscdb) to extract chat and composer history. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from code repositories and agent logs which may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untracked files discovered via
git status, scoped git diffs, and historical session logs in JSON, JSONL, or SQLite formats. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when reading external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
git,grep,sqlite3) and write generated articles to the filesystem (docs/articles/). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to prevent the execution of instructions embedded in the analyzed code or history.
Audit Metadata