jwt-encode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides a command to automatically install the
josepackage globally usingnpm install -gif the library is not found. While functional, this represents an external software dependency that is fetched and installed during runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses shell templates that interpolate user-supplied data, such as secrets and claims, directly into command strings (e.g.,
JWT_SECRET='user-provided-secret'). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the user-provided content contains shell operators or single quotes designed to break out of the variable assignment. - Ingestion points: User-provided JWT secrets, algorithm choices, and payload claims processed in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to isolate or sanitize user input before command interpolation.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
node -e(JavaScript execution),python3 -c(Python execution), andopenssl(file system writes and cryptographic operations). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no guidance for the agent to escape shell-sensitive characters in the user's secrets or claim values.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell-based execution of script snippets via
nodeandpython3flags, as well as complexopensslpiping for token signing. These methods bypass standard file-based execution and increase the difficulty of auditing the final executed code.
Audit Metadata