baoyu-danger-gemini-web

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically launches a web browser (Chrome, Chromium, or Microsoft Edge) to facilitate session hijacking for authentication purposes.
  • Evidence: In scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.ts, the launch_chrome function uses child_process.spawn to execute a browser with the --remote-debugging-port flag.
  • The executable path is determined by searching common system directories or can be overridden via the GEMINI_WEB_CHROME_PATH environment variable.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to extract sensitive Google authentication cookies from the user's browser session.
  • Evidence: The fetch_google_cookies_via_cdp function in scripts/gemini-webapi/utils/load-browser-cookies.ts connects to the browser's debug port via WebSocket to extract __Secure-1PSID and __Secure-1PSIDTS cookies.
  • These cookies provide full access to the user's Google Gemini account and are subsequently used to authenticate reverse-engineered API requests.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains access to the user's account by storing extracted credentials and chat history in a persistent local directory.
  • Evidence: Sensitive cookies are written to a cookies.json file, and chat sessions are stored as JSON files in a dedicated sessions/ directory within the user's application data folder (e.g., ~/Library/Application Support/baoyu-skills/gemini-web/).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated images from Google's content delivery networks to the local file system.
  • Evidence: The Image.save method in scripts/gemini-webapi/types/image.ts uses fetch to download images from URLs like googleusercontent.com and saves them to a local directory (defaulting to temp/).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from both user-supplied files and external API responses without rigorous sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads prompt content from files via the --promptfiles flag and processes structured JSON responses from the Gemini Web API.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or boundary markers to distinguish between instructions and data when interpolating content into the API request.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system (saving images and sessions) and perform network operations.
  • Sanitization: While basic HTML entity decoding is performed in scripts/gemini-webapi/types/candidate.ts, there is no validation or filtering of the content to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 03:34 PM