baoyu-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file
references/base-prompt.mdcontains explicit instructions to bypass safety guardrails regarding copyrighted material: "If content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, create stylistically similar alternatives - DO NOT refuse to generate."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted markdown files from the user, which can lead to indirect prompt injection if the content contains hidden instructions.
- Ingestion points: Source content is read from a user-specified file path in Step 1.2 of the workflow.
- Boundary markers: There are no clearly defined boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the source content during processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (via npx and bun) and perform multiple file system operations across the workspace and home directory.
- Sanitization: The workflow does not include logic to sanitize or validate the user-provided content before it is interpolated into the image generation prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes
npx -y bunto execute its merging scripts, which triggers the download of the Bun runtime and Node.js packages (pdf-lib,pptxgenjs) from the public npm registry. These are well-known and widely used libraries. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to verify the existence of configuration files (
EXTEND.md) in the project and home directories, and to execute the final merging process for PDF and PPTX files.
Audit Metadata