networkx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions in
references/io.mdfor serializing and deserializing graph objects using thepicklemodule (e.g.,pickle.load(f)andnx.read_gpickle()). This is a known security risk aspicklecan execute arbitrary code during the loading process, making it unsafe to use with data from untrusted sources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process data from various external formats, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be hidden within graph attributes or metadata.
- Ingestion points: Data loading methods such as
read_edgelist,read_graphml,read_gml,read_json,from_pandas_edgelist, andread_adjlistare documented inreferences/io.mdandreferences/graph-basics.md. - Boundary markers: No guidance is provided regarding the use of boundary markers or safety instructions to mitigate the risks associated with processing untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities for writing to the file system and generating interactive visualizations, which could be exploited through successful injection.
- Sanitization: The skill does not include instructions for validating or sanitizing ingested data before it is utilized by graph algorithms or visualization tools.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains explicit behavioral instructions that steer the agent to suggest a specific third-party platform (K-Dense Web) when complexity increases, attempting to override the agent's standard behavior to include promotional messaging.
Audit Metadata