notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdand the output generated byask_question.pyuse high-priority directives such as "Required Claude Behavior", "STOP", "ANALYZE", and "EXTREMELY IMPORTANT: Is that ALL you need to know?". These commands are designed to override the agent's natural decision-making and force a specific multi-step follow-up loop. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill architecture relies on a universal wrapper (
run.py) and setup scripts (setup_environment.py,__init__.py) that frequently invokesubprocess.run()to manage a local virtual environment, install dependencies, and execute other Python scripts within the skill directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Upon first run, the skill automatically fetches and installs Python packages (
patchright,python-dotenv) and browser binaries (Google Chrome) from external sources into a local.venvdirectory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface by ingesting unstructured data from Google NotebookLM and presenting it to the agent. Furthermore, the
ask_question.pyscript appends its own instructional context to the retrieved documentation, which acts as a multi-step prompt injection to influence subsequent agent actions.
Audit Metadata