tts-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes system commands to play generated audio files across different platforms.\n
- Evidence: The
play_audiofunction inassets/minimax_tts.pycallssubprocess.runto invoke system utilities likeafplay,aplay,mpv, orffplay.\n - Context: This execution is a primary feature of the skill. It is implemented securely by passing arguments as a list rather than a single string, effectively preventing shell injection vulnerabilities.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external API data and user-provided text.\n
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
list_voicesfunction (retrieving metadata from the MiniMax API) and thetext_to_audioandvoice_designfunctions (handling user-provided text and prompts).\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard potential commands hidden within the processed voice metadata or input text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to make network requests, write files to the local system, and execute system commands for audio playback.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings or API response content is implemented before processing.
Audit Metadata