plugin-migrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like
git mvto relocate files while preserving repository history. It also provides agrepcommand targeted at$HOME/.claude/pluginsto help the agent locate the plugin's installation directory by searching for its manifest file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and restructure untrusted project-level data, creating an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and evaluates user-controlled project files including
AGENTS.md,.agents/MEMORY.md,.sdd-devkit/settings.json, and various specification documents within the repository. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly state that the skill must not re-edit, summarize, or translate user wording, and it must obtain approval for a complete migration plan before modifying any files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform file moves using
git mvand execute shell-based discovery commands. - Sanitization: The skill implements a manual checkpoint by requiring the agent to present all findings and proposed actions to the user in a single confirmation step.
Audit Metadata