pr-create
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from the repository history that could influence the agent's actions during the PR creation process.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads branch names and commit subjects via
git logandgit rev-parsecommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions or delimiters provided to prevent the agent from accidentally executing instructions embedded in git metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to push code (
git push), move files (git mv), delete files (rm -f), and execute various platform CLIs (gh,glab,az,tea) andcurlcommands as defined inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not explicitly describe validation or escaping for the strings derived from the repository before they are interpolated into PR fields or CLI commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands for GitHub, GitLab, and other CLIs using dynamic strings extracted from the git environment. This creates a surface for command injection if a malicious actor provides a specially crafted branch name or commit message containing shell metacharacters that are not escaped by the agent platform.
Audit Metadata