requirement-refine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input in the form of raw requirements (text, tickets, emails) and multimedia assets (images, diagrams). It also utilizes a subagent for validation, creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the input could influence the agent's behavior or the validation results.
- Ingestion points: Raw requirements and user-provided files (images, PDFs, captures) are stored in the 'docs/specs/requirements/SRS-XXX-[nombre-corto]/references/' directory and read during the specification process.
- Boundary markers: The instructions describe a structured workflow but do not explicitly mandate the use of delimiters or specific 'ignore' instructions when the ingested content is processed or passed to the validation subagent in Ola 3.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (spec documents and wireframes) and can invoke other agent skills such as '/work-research', '/work-define', and '/work-plan'.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the ingested content before it is interpolated into the specification document or provided to the validation subagent.
Audit Metadata