pretty
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute code generated by a sub-agent directly in the terminal vianode -e. Running generated code without human review or strict sandboxing is a high-risk pattern. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external AI agent (
gsp-ascii-artist) to produce the executable payload. This creates a runtime code execution path where the logic is not statically defined and is subject to the model's output. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the local development environment and passes it to a code-generating agent without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
git log --oneline -5,package.json,README.md, andgit diff --stat(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions (like "ignore embedded commands") are provided to the sub-agent to distinguish between the gathered context and actual instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, which is explicitly used to run the generatednode -ecommands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validating the input data before it is interpolated into the artist agent's prompt.
Audit Metadata