ArgocdClusterBootstrapping
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute multiple shell commands to manage infrastructure state.
- The agent is prompted to use
kubectlfor querying and inspecting cluster resources, such as applications, CRDs, and secrets as seen inWorkflows/DiagnoseSyncFailure.mdandWorkflows/OnboardCluster.md. - Git commands including
git add,git commit, andgit pushare used to synchronize local changes with remote infrastructure repositories inWorkflows/CreateRootApplication.mdandWorkflows/OnboardCluster.md. - Supporting tools like
kustomize,jq, and theargocdCLI are utilized for manifest processing and validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon data from the execution environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads output from
kubectl get application -o yamlinWorkflows/DiagnoseSyncFailure.mdand directory listings vialsorgrepinWorkflows/CreateRootApplication.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit markers or delimiters to separate tool output from instructions, creating a risk of accidental obedience if external data is maliciously crafted.
- Capability inventory: Across the workflow scripts, the agent has capabilities to perform file writes, modify Git repositories (
git push), and update cluster state (kubectl apply,argocd app create). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content received from external command outputs before it influences agent logic.
Audit Metadata