atuin
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install Atuin by downloading a script from
https://setup.atuin.shand piping it directly into a shell (curl ... | sh). This pattern, found inSKILL.md,references/sync-setup.md, andreferences/troubleshooting.md, represents a significant security risk as it executes remote code without prior verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation instructs the agent to configure shell integration using
eval "$(atuin init [shell])". This executes dynamically generated code from the Atuin binary within the user's shell environment. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes commands that use
sudoto move shell completion scripts into system-wide protected directories such as/usr/local/share/zsh/site-functions/and/etc/bash_completion.d/. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The core functionality of the skill involves synchronizing the user's shell history (which may contain sensitive information) to a remote server at
https://api.atuin.sh. While the service uses encryption, it facilitates the systematic transmission of local activity data to an external endpoint. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
evalto execute shell initialization scripts generated at runtime by the tool, which is a form of dynamic code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and search shell history. Because shell history is essentially untrusted data that can be influenced by external scripts or malicious command outputs, it creates a vector for indirect prompt injection where the agent might interpret history entries as instructions.
- Ingestion points:
atuin import autoand various search commands documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between history data and commands.
- Capability inventory: Access to shell execution (
eval), system-level file modification (sudo), and network operations for synchronization. - Sanitization: While a
secrets_filteris mentioned for the synchronization process, there is no evidence of sanitization to protect the agent's logic from malicious content within the history data itself.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://setup.atuin.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata