atuin

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install Atuin by downloading a script from https://setup.atuin.sh and piping it directly into a shell (curl ... | sh). This pattern, found in SKILL.md, references/sync-setup.md, and references/troubleshooting.md, represents a significant security risk as it executes remote code without prior verification.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation instructs the agent to configure shell integration using eval "$(atuin init [shell])". This executes dynamically generated code from the Atuin binary within the user's shell environment.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes commands that use sudo to move shell completion scripts into system-wide protected directories such as /usr/local/share/zsh/site-functions/ and /etc/bash_completion.d/.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The core functionality of the skill involves synchronizing the user's shell history (which may contain sensitive information) to a remote server at https://api.atuin.sh. While the service uses encryption, it facilitates the systematic transmission of local activity data to an external endpoint.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses eval to execute shell initialization scripts generated at runtime by the tool, which is a form of dynamic code execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and search shell history. Because shell history is essentially untrusted data that can be influenced by external scripts or malicious command outputs, it creates a vector for indirect prompt injection where the agent might interpret history entries as instructions.
  • Ingestion points: atuin import auto and various search commands documented in SKILL.md and references/commands.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between history data and commands.
  • Capability inventory: Access to shell execution (eval), system-level file modification (sudo), and network operations for synchronization.
  • Sanitization: While a secrets_filter is mentioned for the synchronization process, there is no evidence of sanitization to protect the agent's logic from malicious content within the history data itself.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://setup.atuin.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 06:11 PM