vault-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a global context injection feature in
Tools/VaultBuilder.pyandWorkflows/Setup.md. Theinject-globalcommand modifies the~/.claude/CLAUDE.mdfile, which is a global configuration that the AI agent reads at the beginning of every session. This establishes a persistent instruction set for the agent across all project environments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, potentially untrusted data during setup and importation flows, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User free-text input during the interview step in
Workflows/Setup.mdand external documents (Markdown, PDF, Text, DOCX) imported viascripts/process_docs_to_obsidian.py. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks boundary markers or instructions to treat ingested content as data rather than instructions when the agent is asked to 'sort the inbox'.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification, symlink creation, and global configuration changes.
- Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of user input before it is interpolated into the vault's
CLAUDE.md, nor is there content filtering for imported files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands within the user's environment to perform setup and verification tasks. Examples include directory management (
mkdir), process checking (pgrepused inWorkflows/Verify.md), and cross-platform application opening (open,xdg-open,startinWorkflows/Setup.md). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/score_skills.shutility script usespython3 -c "compile(...)"to perform runtime syntax validation on Python scripts within the skill's directory structure and neighboring skill folders.
Audit Metadata