code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses user-provided input (the 'fixed point') directly in shell commands such as
git diff <fixed-point>...HEAD,git log <fixed-point>..HEAD, andgit rev-parse <fixed-point>. If the agent platform does not sanitize these arguments, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from git diffs, commit messages, and external issue trackers/specifications, which is then passed into the prompts of parallel sub-agents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious code or comments could manipulate the reviewer's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters via
git diff,git log, and the contents of spec files located indocs/,specs/,.scratch/, or fetched from external issue trackers. - Boundary markers: The instructions for the sub-agents do not include robust boundary markers or specific guidance to ignore instructions embedded within the code or specifications being reviewed.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of executing shell commands and spawning sub-agents with broad access to the repository context.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation for the external data and diff content before it is processed by the AI sub-agents.
Audit Metadata