wayfinder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its 'Research' ticket functionality. This feature utilizes subagents to ingest data from external, untrusted sources such as third-party documentation and APIs to resolve project decisions. This ingested content is then integrated into the project's 'Map' and 'Decisions so far', providing a vector for external data to influence the agent's logic or future planning steps.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved by
/researchsubagents from external documentation, APIs, and local knowledge resources as described in the 'Ticket Types' section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the data returned by research subagents before it is appended to the shared map.
- Capability inventory: The skill can modify issues on a tracker, assign users, close tickets, and trigger further sub-skills or manual tasks based on the findings.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit requirements for sanitization or validation of external research findings before they are utilized to update the project's canonical artifacts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill authorizes the agent to autonomously perform environment-altering manual work under the 'Task (AFK)' ticket type. These tasks include 'provisioning access' and 'moving data' to unblock project decisions, which may involve shell command execution or system-level modifications without immediate human oversight.
- Evidence: The 'Ticket Types' section in
SKILL.mdexplicitly allows 'Task' tickets to be driven 'by the agent alone where it can (AFK)' for tasks like provisioning and data movement.
Audit Metadata