zj-resolving-merge-conflicts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill directs the agent to ingest and analyze untrusted external content, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Step 2) instructs the agent to read commit messages, pull requests (PRs), and original issues/tickets to understand intent. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore potential instructions embedded within the analyzed metadata or descriptions.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.md(Step 4) requires the agent to execute automated checks, which involve running shell commands for testing, type-checking, and formatting. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or escaping content retrieved from external git or issue-tracking systems before the agent processes it.
Audit Metadata