setup-playbook-jupi
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions mandate storing the
neonConnString(database credentials) directly within the prompt text of cloud-scheduled tasks. Task metadata and prompt descriptions in scheduling services are often not encrypted or are visible in administrative logs, presenting a high risk of credential exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple internal vendor scripts (e.g.,
ensure-deps.sh,apply-schema.mjs,playbook.mjs,db.mjs) usingbashandnodecommands from the plugin's shared directory. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill establishes persistent, unattended execution by creating two cloud-scheduled routines (
Playbook-Jupi — catchupandPlaybook-Jupi — daily) which run on cron-like cadences. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from user-provided documents and dossiers, creating a vulnerability surface for instruction injection. 1. Ingestion points:
playbookSources(arbitrary user documents) anddossierSource(external data files). 2. Boundary markers: Employs a soft constraint directing the agent to treat document content as data rather than instructions. 3. Capability inventory: Includes filesystem access, database writes, and autonomous task scheduling. 4. Sanitization: No robust sanitization or validation is specified for data extracted from the source documents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata