solana-agent-kit

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The MCP server installation guide in examples/mcp-server/README.md instructs users to download a shell script from an external repository using curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sendaifun/solana-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to grant execution permissions (chmod +x) to the downloaded remote script and execute it immediately (./solana-mcp-install.sh). This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from a third-party source during the setup process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The toolkit frequently uses shell-based commands for setup and provides interactive CLI templates (templates/agent-template.ts) that execute blockchain logic via ts-node based on user input.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection by exposing tools that perform irreversible financial actions (e.g., transfer, trade, lend) based on raw natural language input.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided strings in chat interfaces, autonomous task descriptions, and MCP tool inputs.
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes system prompt instructions such as "Never reveal private keys" and "Always confirm large transactions," which provide some protection but do not eliminate the underlying injection risk.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has broad capabilities including token transfers, DeFi pool creation, and automated trading across all integrated scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or filtering before passing user instructions to the LLM for tool selection and execution.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 4, 2026, 12:32 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — solana-agent-kit