solana-agent-kit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The MCP server installation guide in
examples/mcp-server/README.mdinstructs users to download a shell script from an external repository usingcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sendaifun/solana-mcp/main/scripts/install.sh. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to grant execution permissions (
chmod +x) to the downloaded remote script and execute it immediately (./solana-mcp-install.sh). This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution from a third-party source during the setup process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The toolkit frequently uses shell-based commands for setup and provides interactive CLI templates (
templates/agent-template.ts) that execute blockchain logic viats-nodebased on user input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection by exposing tools that perform irreversible financial actions (e.g.,
transfer,trade,lend) based on raw natural language input. - Ingestion points: User-provided strings in chat interfaces, autonomous task descriptions, and MCP tool inputs.
- Boundary markers: The skill includes system prompt instructions such as "Never reveal private keys" and "Always confirm large transactions," which provide some protection but do not eliminate the underlying injection risk.
- Capability inventory: The agent has broad capabilities including token transfers, DeFi pool creation, and automated trading across all integrated scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or filtering before passing user instructions to the LLM for tool selection and execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata