sui
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
publishPackageandupgradePackagefunctions inexamples/deploy-module/README.mdandSKILL.mduse theexecSyncfunction to call the Sui CLI. ThepackagePathvariable is interpolated directly into the shell command string (e.g.,`sui move build ... --path ${packagePath}`) without any validation or escaping. If an AI agent were to execute these functions using a path provided by an untrusted user, it could lead to arbitrary shell command execution on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and
Move.tomlconfiguration files reference the official MystenLabs GitHub repository (https://github.com/MystenLabs/sui.git) for installing the Sui CLI and fetching framework dependencies. These are well-known and authoritative sources for the Sui ecosystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of on-chain data, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
client.getCoins,client.getOwnedObjects,client.getObject, andclient.queryEventsas seen inexamples/read-chain-state/README.md. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing retrieved chain data.
- Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill has the capability to sign and execute on-chain transactions (
signAndExecuteTransaction) and execute system commands (execSync). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from the blockchain before it is used in logic or presented to the agent.
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