skills/justaname-id/cryptoskills/sui/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sui

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The publishPackage and upgradePackage functions in examples/deploy-module/README.md and SKILL.md use the execSync function to call the Sui CLI. The packagePath variable is interpolated directly into the shell command string (e.g., `sui move build ... --path ${packagePath}`) without any validation or escaping. If an AI agent were to execute these functions using a path provided by an untrusted user, it could lead to arbitrary shell command execution on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and Move.toml configuration files reference the official MystenLabs GitHub repository (https://github.com/MystenLabs/sui.git) for installing the Sui CLI and fetching framework dependencies. These are well-known and authoritative sources for the Sui ecosystem.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the retrieval of on-chain data, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through client.getCoins, client.getOwnedObjects, client.getObject, and client.queryEvents as seen in examples/read-chain-state/README.md.
  • Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing retrieved chain data.
  • Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill has the capability to sign and execute on-chain transactions (signAndExecuteTransaction) and execute system commands (execSync).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from the blockchain before it is used in logic or presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 4, 2026, 12:31 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sui