agent-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the system
gitbinary and user-configuredcodexorclaudeCLI tools to perform code reviews. \n - Evidence: The
runGit,invokeCodex, andinvokeClaudefunctions inscripts/agent-review.tsmanage subprocess execution using Bun'sspawnSync. \n - Control: The
validateExternalPathfunction verifies that the review binaries are not located within the repository being reviewed, preventing the execution of malicious local tools. \n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted repository content which could contain malicious instructions. \n - Ingestion points:
collectScopeandbuildBundleinscripts/agent-review.tsread the git diff and file snapshots from the worktree or a commit. \n - Boundary markers:
reviewerPromptwraps the untrusted bundle in a random UUID-based delimiter (AGENT_REVIEW_BUNDLE_${crypto.randomUUID()}) to isolate it from the reviewer instructions. \n - Capability inventory: The skill calls
gitfor repository state andcodex/claudefor review logic execution. \n - Sanitization:
isSensitivePathfilters out credentials and private keys from the ingested data set. \n- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill minimizes the risk of sensitive data exposure by implementing a 'Sensitive Input Boundary'. \n - Evidence: The
isSensitivePathfunction identifies and blocks files typically containing credentials, such as.envfiles, SSH private keys, and cloud provider configurations, from being included in the review bundle sent to external LLM providers. \n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill prevents environment-based injection attacks when spawning subprocesses. \n - Evidence: The
safeEnvironmentfunction inscripts/agent-review.tsstrips dangerous environment variables likeNODE_OPTIONS,BASH_ENV, andGIT_CONFIGbefore executing system tools.
Audit Metadata