jww-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated context injection mechanism that reads data from the file system, creating a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: The
hooks/session-start.shscript scans the.handoffs/directory and reads the content of the most recently modified markdown file. - Boundary markers: The script wraps the file content with a '--- handoff contents ---' header but lacks specific defensive instructions to prevent the agent from executing instructions found within the file.
- Capability inventory: The agent environment (Claude Code, etc.) has extensive capabilities including file modification and command execution, which could be leveraged if the handoff content is malicious.
- Sanitization: No content validation or sanitization is performed on the handoff files before injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts and embedded Python to perform its tasks.
hooks/session-start.shexecutes shell commands and an embedded Python script to process file metadata and content.hooks/pre-compact.shruns as a shell command to provide prompts during context compaction.- [PERSISTENCE]: The installation process involves permanent modifications to user and agent configuration files.
- Recommends adding hooks to
~/.claude/settings.jsonto automate skill execution across sessions. - Recommends modifying global Git configuration using
git config --global core.excludesfileto ensure persistent behavior across repositories. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions to install the skill from a remote repository using the
npx skills add justin/jww-skillscommand, which downloads the skill code from an external registry.
Audit Metadata