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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file deletion and process termination using shell commands that interpolate variables derived from local state files.\n
- Evidence: The implementation steps in SKILL.md include instructions like
rm -rf .rcs/state/team/{name}/andtmux kill-session -t rcs-team-{name}where{name}is extracted from a configuration file.\n - Risk: If the
team_namevalue withinconfig.jsonis manipulated to include path traversal sequences (e.g.,../../), it could lead to the unintended deletion of files outside the designated state directory or the termination of unrelated tmux sessions.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its reliance on untrusted external state data to drive its logic.\n - Ingestion points: The skill reads various JSON files from the
.rcs/state/directory, includingconfig.json,autopilot-state.json, andforge-state.json, to determine mode status and cleanup targets.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between control logic and data ingested from these state files.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant local capabilities, including recursive file deletion (
rm -rf), inter-process communication viatmux send-keys, process termination, and the ability to modify workspace documentation (AGENTS.md).\n - Sanitization: The skill logic does not explicitly include steps to sanitize or validate keys and values read from state files before they are interpolated into shell commands or documentation updates.
Audit Metadata