team
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions and environment configuration facilitate the bypassing of critical safety guardrails and permission filters.
- Evidence: The skill instructs that Claude-based worker agents should be launched with the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag, which disables security checkpoints for the sub-agents (found inSKILL.md). - Evidence: The
RCS_TEAM_AUTO_ACCEPT_BYPASSenvironment variable is documented to auto-advance past security prompts by default, specifically automating the input2+ Enter (found inSKILL.md).- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes a mechanism for automated command execution across multiple persistent shell sessions. - Evidence: The implementation uses
tmux send-keysto programmatically deliver triggers and instructions to worker panes (found inSKILL.md). - Evidence: The environment variable
RCS_TEAM_WORKER_LAUNCH_ARGSallows for the injection of arbitrary command-line arguments into the initialization of worker agent processes (found inSKILL.md). - Evidence: The
RCS_TEAM_WORKER_CLIandRCS_TEAM_WORKER_CLI_MAPvariables determine the executable launched for each worker, allowing for the execution of different CLI tools based on environment configuration (found inSKILL.md).- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external task data and context files to generate instructions for worker agents, creating an attack surface for instruction injection. - Ingestion points: Task descriptions provided via command-line arguments and markdown files stored in
.rcs/context/(found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are defined to isolate user-provided task content from the worker agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell command execution via
tmux, filesystem write access for state management, and Git operations (found inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill documentation mentions sanitizing team names from task text but does not describe validation or sanitization of the actual task content (found in
SKILL.md).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata