codex-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands to interact with the
codexandgitcommand-line interfaces. Scripts such asscripts/codex-ask.shandscripts/codex-review-changes.shuse safe array expansion patterns to prevent command injection when passing user-defined tasks or file paths to the underlying tools.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: References the externalcodexCLI tool, provided by OpenAI, as a mandatory dependency. Documentation directs users to established sources for installation, such as Homebrew or the official GitHub repository, which are recognized as safe sources for development tools.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit repository data, including file contents and git diffs, to the external OpenAI Codex service for analysis. This data flow is documented, requires the presence of an authenticatedcodexinstallation, and is subject to user-configurable sandbox and approval policies designed to mitigate unauthorized access to local resources.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an analysis tool for repository content, the skill represents an indirect prompt injection surface when processing untrusted code. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
git diffoutputs and file reads performed inscripts/codex-ask.shandscripts/codex-review-changes.sh. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured templates (e.g.,
templates/delegation-prompt.md) with explicit headers like 'Task:' and 'Context:' to separate instructions from data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute CLI commands (
codex,git) and read local files. - Sanitization: The tool relies on the
codexCLI's native read-only sandbox mode and user confirmation gates rather than performing complex input sanitization on the reviewed code.
Audit Metadata