cursor-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the local
cursor-agentandgitbinaries through wrapper scripts (cursor-review-changes.sh,cursor-ask.sh,cursor-doctor-check.sh). These scripts useset -euo pipefailand handle arguments carefully to prevent shell injection. Thecursor-agentinvocation defaults to--mode planor--mode ask, ensuring a read-only stance for external reviews. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill transmits data to Cursor's external agent, it includes explicit guidelines and activation rules to check for secrets, private data, or production credentials before transmission. It provides a
--dry-runflag in all scripts, allowing users to inspect the prompt and command before actual execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data in the form of git diffs and context files.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/cursor-review-changes.shreads git diffs;scripts/cursor-ask.shreads arbitrary context files. - Boundary markers: Prompts in
templates/use clear Markdown headers (e.g.,# Change Context,Context:,Task:) to separate instructions from data. - Capability inventory: Capabilities are limited to calling
cursor-agent(configured for read-only) andgitfor status/diffs. - Sanitization: Scripts implement truncation (
max_diff_bytesand line limits for context files) and binary file detection (usinggrep -Iq) to prevent large or malformed payloads from disrupting the model. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill depends on a well-known external tool (
cursor-agent). There are no patterns of downloading and executing remote scripts (e.g.,curl | bash). The logic for execution is entirely local and scoped to the provided scripts. - [SAFE]: The skill follows best practices for agent-to-agent delegation, including reconciling external feedback against local evidence and treating the external model's output as a 'second opinion' rather than a definitive authority.
Audit Metadata