visual-explainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute system-level commands such as
open,xdg-open, orstartto launch the default web browser and display the generated HTML visualization. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the generated HTML to load external libraries (Mermaid and Tailwind CSS) from public CDNs at runtime. While these are well-known services, it represents a dependency on external code for the visualization to function correctly.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include a directive to bypass user confirmation ("Don't gate on permission: when it applies, produce the page as part of answering"), which increases the autonomy of the agent and reduces user oversight for file-writing and command-execution tasks. Additionally, the skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data to generate the HTML content.
- Ingestion points: User-provided code snippets or architectural descriptions processed in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify using delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the data embedded in the HTML.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the filesystem (
$TMPDIR) and execute browser-opening commands. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no instruction to sanitize, escape, or validate external content before interpolating it into the Mermaid or HTML template.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill writes generated content to the OS temporary directory (
$TMPDIRor%TEMP%) and outputs the absolute path to the terminal. This behavior moves data from the agent's workspace into a global system path accessible to other processes.
Audit Metadata