ensemble-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct users to grant broad shell permissions to agents by adding
Bash(*)to the allowed tools in.claude/settings.jsonduring the setup phase. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The workflow recommends configuring the 'Driver' agents with unrestricted file editing and shell access, which represents a high-privilege tool configuration within the development environment.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core operational model.
- Ingestion points: Agents are designed to read and process project source code, documentation (PROJECT.md, glossary.md), and user-supplied product vision statements.
- Boundary markers: The provided templates and protocols do not define specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions to prevent agents from following malicious prompts embedded in ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The 'Driver' agents possess
Edit,Write, andBash(*)capabilities, enabling arbitrary file and system manipulation. - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms for sanitizing or validating external content before it is interpolated into agent contexts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates agent definition files (
.claude/agents/*.md) and coordinator instructions (.team/coordinator-instructions.md) based on project metadata, which are subsequently loaded to define the behavior and instructions for subagents.
Audit Metadata