ensemble-team

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct users to grant broad shell permissions to agents by adding Bash(*) to the allowed tools in .claude/settings.json during the setup phase.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The workflow recommends configuring the 'Driver' agents with unrestricted file editing and shell access, which represents a high-privilege tool configuration within the development environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core operational model.
  • Ingestion points: Agents are designed to read and process project source code, documentation (PROJECT.md, glossary.md), and user-supplied product vision statements.
  • Boundary markers: The provided templates and protocols do not define specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions to prevent agents from following malicious prompts embedded in ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The 'Driver' agents possess Edit, Write, and Bash(*) capabilities, enabling arbitrary file and system manipulation.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms for sanitizing or validating external content before it is interpolated into agent contexts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates agent definition files (.claude/agents/*.md) and coordinator instructions (.team/coordinator-instructions.md) based on project metadata, which are subsequently loaded to define the behavior and instructions for subagents.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 04:41 PM