academic-figure-generation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a third-party repository from GitHub (
https://github.com/dwzhu-pku/PaperBanana) as part of the setup process. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/generate.pyscript dynamically adds the path of the cloned repository to the Python system path (sys.path.insert(0, str(project_root))) and imports several modules (e.g.,agents.planner_agent,agents.visualizer_agent). This results in the execution of code from an external, unverified source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides shell commands for cloning repositories, installing dependencies using
uv, and executing the generation script with various parameters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted paper text provided by the user.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/generate.pyscript reads the full content of a file provided via the--method-fileargument. - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to isolate the ingested text from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (PNG images and
results.json) and triggers network activity through the underlying LLM and image generation models. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input text before it is passed to the multi-agent pipeline.
Audit Metadata