social-media-paper-triage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted social media platforms and online articles.
  • Ingestion points: Fetches content via xhs.get_note, wechat_article.py, xreach, reddit.read_post, bilibili.get_video_info, and r.jina.ai as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the user's Zotero library, execute shell commands, and perform network requests.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation logic is defined for the external content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves executing shell commands that interpolate external URLs.
  • Evidence: Instructs the execution of python3 ~/.agent-reach/.venv/bin/wechat_article.py "URL", xreach tweet URL --json, and curl -s "https://r.jina.ai/URL". These patterns represent a command injection surface if the URL parameters are not safely escaped by the underlying platform.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the well-known service Jina Reader (r.jina.ai) to fetch and convert web content into markdown format for processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 12:21 PM