social-media-paper-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from untrusted social media platforms and online articles.
- Ingestion points: Fetches content via
xhs.get_note,wechat_article.py,xreach,reddit.read_post,bilibili.get_video_info, andr.jina.aias defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the user's Zotero library, execute shell commands, and perform network requests.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation logic is defined for the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves executing shell commands that interpolate external URLs.
- Evidence: Instructs the execution of
python3 ~/.agent-reach/.venv/bin/wechat_article.py "URL",xreach tweet URL --json, andcurl -s "https://r.jina.ai/URL". These patterns represent a command injection surface if the URL parameters are not safely escaped by the underlying platform. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the well-known service Jina Reader (
r.jina.ai) to fetch and convert web content into markdown format for processing.
Audit Metadata