downloader-operation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/mp-downloader.py employs importlib.import_module to load downloader client classes at runtime. While the specific module paths are retrieved from a hardcoded internal map (PROVIDER_CLASSES), this constitutes dynamic code loading behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tasks.add.direct action allows the AI agent to read the contents of local files by specifying a path in the content argument when torrent_file is set to true. This functionality could be exploited to read sensitive system files if the agent is manipulated into accessing unauthorized paths.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external downloader instances, such as torrent names, tracker information, and tags, which are ingested into the agent's context. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the external data contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the downloader via multiple actions including tasks.list, tasks.trackers, and tasks.peers in scripts/mp-downloader.py.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to treat downloader-provided strings as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes execute_command to run a local Python script capable of file system reads and downloader state modification.
  • Sanitization: The script actively filters known sensitive keys (e.g., passwords, tokens) but does not sanitize the content of descriptive fields that may contain injection payloads.
  • [SAFE]: The script implements proactive security measures, including the _is_sensitive_key and _jsonable functions, which are designed to identify and remove credentials, API keys, and session tokens from the data returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 03:08 PM