downloader-operation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mp-downloader.pyemploysimportlib.import_moduleto load downloader client classes at runtime. While the specific module paths are retrieved from a hardcoded internal map (PROVIDER_CLASSES), this constitutes dynamic code loading behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
tasks.add.directaction allows the AI agent to read the contents of local files by specifying a path in thecontentargument whentorrent_fileis set to true. This functionality could be exploited to read sensitive system files if the agent is manipulated into accessing unauthorized paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external downloader instances, such as torrent names, tracker information, and tags, which are ingested into the agent's context. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the external data contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the downloader via multiple actions including
tasks.list,tasks.trackers, andtasks.peersinscripts/mp-downloader.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to treat downloader-provided strings as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
execute_commandto run a local Python script capable of file system reads and downloader state modification. - Sanitization: The script actively filters known sensitive keys (e.g., passwords, tokens) but does not sanitize the content of descriptive fields that may contain injection payloads.
- [SAFE]: The script implements proactive security measures, including the
_is_sensitive_keyand_jsonablefunctions, which are designed to identify and remove credentials, API keys, and session tokens from the data returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata