moviepilot-api
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'Read-only Python aggregation' feature as described in
code-execution.md. This allows the agent to execute Python code via a host kernel using themoviepilot_toolslibrary. While documented as read-only, runtime code generation and execution constitute a significant dynamic execution vector. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
plugin.mdcontract includes operations such asplugin.installandplugin.source.installwhich download and install software from external repositories provided via therepo_urlparameter. This allows for the introduction of external code into the host environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates high-impact system changes, including process restarts (
system.restart) and system-wide upgrades to development branches (system.upgrade.dev), which involve the execution of critical system-level commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a substantial surface area for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through torrent search results (
search.md), site RSS feeds and resources (site.md), and media metadata scraping (media.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are instructed for use when the agent handles or interpolates these external strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to destructive and high-privilege tools, including file deletion (
storage.md), plugin lifecycle management (plugin.md), and system configuration updates (config.md). - Sanitization: There are no requirements for sanitizing, escaping, or filtering external content before it is processed or used in subsequent operations.
Audit Metadata