jev-codex-computer-use
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the browser's accessibility state (AX tree), containing the content and structure of the visited webpage, to external API providers to facilitate navigation decisions.
- Evidence: The
decidefunction inscripts/bridge.mjsmakes POST requests tohttps://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemoneandhttps://openrouter.ai/api/alpha/decisionscontaining browser state data.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses API keys stored in environment files on the local filesystem. - Evidence: In
scripts/bridge.mjs, theloadConfigfunction retrieves the path to anenvFilefrom the user's configuration directory (~/.config/jev-codex-computer-use/), and thedecidefunction subsequently reads this file to extract keys for theAuthorizationheader.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the accessibility tree data it ingests from external webpages. - Ingestion points:
scripts/bridge.mjsretrieves untrusted page content viatab.getAXState(). - Boundary markers: The content is packaged into a JSON request body sent to a decision model.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute actions like
click,scroll, andpressKeyin the browser based on the model's response. - Sanitization: The bridge provides instructions to the decision model to treat page content as untrusted data.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages dynamic loading of its bridge script during runtime initialization.
- Evidence: The integration examples in
references/runtime.mdsuggest usingawait import(bridgeUrl)to load thebridge.mjsmodule.
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