ai4pkm-helper

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to ingest and process content from external directories and third-party services, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via external pollers (Apple Photos, Apple Notes, Limitless) and monitored file system paths like Ingest/Clippings and Ingest/Articles as defined in the configuration examples (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to prevent the AI from obeying commands hidden within the ingested PKM data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill manages the ai4pkm CLI and coordinates multiple external execution engines, including claude_code, codex_cli, and gemini_cli (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There are no documented steps for validating or escaping content retrieved from external sources before it is passed to the execution workers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 05:06 PM