ai4pkm-helper
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to ingest and process content from external directories and third-party services, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via external pollers (Apple Photos, Apple Notes, Limitless) and monitored file system paths like
Ingest/ClippingsandIngest/Articlesas defined in the configuration examples (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to prevent the AI from obeying commands hidden within the ingested PKM data.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages the
ai4pkmCLI and coordinates multiple external execution engines, includingclaude_code,codex_cli, andgemini_cli(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There are no documented steps for validating or escaping content retrieved from external sources before it is passed to the execution workers.
Audit Metadata