slack-app-weapon
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill includes explicit security directives and guides for verifying Slack request signatures, validating OAuth state parameters for CSRF protection, and managing secrets using environment variables or vaults.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to the following factors:
- Ingestion points: Slack event payloads containing untrusted user-supplied message text enter the agent context via handlers for
app_mentionandmessageevents inguides/04-events-api.mdand the provided app scaffolds. - Boundary markers: The provided code templates do not implement explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for processed message content.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables capabilities such as posting messages to channels (
say(),chat.postMessage) and opening/updating modals (views.open,views.update), which can be influenced by the content of ingested messages. - Sanitization: Examples show direct interpolation of user input (e.g.,
command['text']orevent['text']) into response messages and modal blocks without extensive sanitization.
Audit Metadata