docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime compilation and process injection. It writes hardcoded C source code to a temporary file (lo_socket_shim.c), compiles it using gcc into a shared library, and then uses the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject this library into the soffice (LibreOffice) process. While documented as a Technical workaround for restricted environments, runtime compilation and library injection are highly sensitive behaviors.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/unpack.py is vulnerable to directory traversal (Zip Slip). It utilizes zipfile.extractall() without verifying that the extraction paths of the files inside the archive stay within the designated output directory. A maliciously crafted Word document could potentially overwrite sensitive system files or shell configuration files when processed.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting content from external Word documents. The instructions guide the agent to extract text using pandoc or scripts/office/unpack.py and bring it into the context without using specific boundary markers or sanitization logic to prevent the agent from obeying instructions hidden within the document's content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions (SKILL.md) recommend the installation of the docx library from the public npm registry to enable document generation capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 29, 2026, 12:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — docx