nextflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill directs users to install Nextflow and the nf-test framework by fetching scripts from
https://get.nextflow.ioandhttps://get.nf-test.comand piping them directly tobash. This execution method is flagged as a risk when originating from non-whitelisted domains. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and execution of shell scripts within Nextflow processes that interpolate variables from external sources, potentially allowing for arbitrary command execution if the input is malicious.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Setup instructions include the use of
sudoto move the Nextflow binary into/usr/local/bin/, which involves granting administrative permissions for file system operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads pipeline code, configurations, and container images from various third-party sources, including GitHub (
nf-core/*) and container registries likequay.ioandgalaxyproject.org. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through its handling of external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from CSV samplesheets via the
splitCsvoperator inreferences/language.mdandreferences/running-pipelines.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to separate ingested data from shell script templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for the generation of shell scripts, file writing, and container execution.
- Sanitization: The instructions lack validation or sanitization steps for input data before it is interpolated into shell commands.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.nextflow.io - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata