esm
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation contains implementation examples for caching embeddings and checkpointing long-running batch processes using Python's
picklemodule. Specifically,references/esm-c-api.mdandreferences/forge-api.mddescribeEmbeddingCacheandCheckpointedBatchProcessorclasses that utilizepickle.load()to read from local files. Deserializing data withpickleis insecure and can lead to arbitrary code execution if an attacker modifies the underlying cache or checkpoint files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions for installing the ESM SDK directly from a GitHub repository (
github.com/Biohub/esm.git). While the instructions advise pinning to a specific 40-character commit SHA to mitigate supply chain risks, this still involves executing code from an external repository that is not included in the platform's trusted vendor list. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted protein sequences and structure files which are interpolated into language model prompts, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: External data enters through protein sequence strings and PDB file imports in
SKILL.mdandreferences/biohub-platform.md. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from interpreting sequence data as command overrides.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests to Forge and Biohub APIs and write files to the local system (PDB, mmCIF, and FASTA formats).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sequence validation or sanitization of PDB file content before it is processed by the agent.
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