scientific-slides

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the subprocess.run function across several scripts (scripts/generate_slide_image.py, scripts/generate_schematic.py, and scripts/validate_presentation.py) to execute internal Python sub-scripts and system utilities like pdflatex. These executions use list-based arguments which mitigate shell injection risks and are necessary for the presentation generation and validation workflows.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because untrusted user input is directly interpolated into instructions sent to the external LLM services in scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py and scripts/generate_schematic_ai.py.\n
  • Ingestion points: User-provided slide and schematic descriptions are ingested via command-line arguments (prompt) and passed to AI generation functions.\n
  • Boundary markers: The system prompts for Nano Banana 2 and Gemini 3.7 Flash do not employ delimiters (such as XML tags or unique markers) to separate user content from instruction blocks.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses the ability to execute local commands via subprocess.run, perform network requests to openrouter.ai, and modify the local filesystem.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the user input before it is concatenated into the final prompt string.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 31, 2026, 01:05 AM