k8s-api-troubleshooting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from cluster logs, events, and resource definitions. An attacker with control over these outputs could attempt to inject instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: kubectl logs, kubectl get events, and kubectl describe in SKILL.md and reference files.\n
  • Boundary markers: Instructions explicitly state "Read first, ask before changing" and "Never run a 'Proposed fix'; hand it to the user."\n
  • Capability inventory: Access to kubectl patch, delete, and scale commands.\n
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of log/event content is mentioned before processing.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on kubectl commands to gather information and propose fixes. This is consistent with the skill's purpose and uses standard tool-calling patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 10:34 PM