k8s-coredns-troubleshooting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the Kubernetes cluster, including pod logs (
kubectl logs) and configuration files (kubectl get configmap). If an attacker has compromised a pod or service in the cluster, they could potentially inject malicious instructions into logs or configurations that the AI might interpret as commands. - Ingestion points:
kubectl logs,kubectl get configmap, andkubectl execoutputs inSKILL.mdand both reference files. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are used when interpolating cluster output into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes commands to modify cluster configurations (
kubectl apply) and restart services (kubectl rollout restart). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of cluster data is implemented.
- Mitigation: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to "ask before changing anything" and to hand proposed fixes to the user rather than executing them autonomously.
Audit Metadata