k8s-istio-troubleshooting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
kubectlCLI to perform system inspection and administrative tasks. - Commands include
kubectl get,kubectl describe,kubectl logs, andkubectl rollout restart. - Potentially disruptive operations, such as restarting workloads, are gated by explicit instructions requiring the agent to obtain user consent before execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
kubectl execto interact with the Envoy proxy's administrative API (pilot-agent request GET) inside running containers. - These operations are restricted to specific diagnostic endpoints (
clusters,stats) and are limited to HTTP GET requests. - Execution is placed under an "Ask first" directive, ensuring the agent requests user permission before the command is run.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and interprets untrusted data from the Kubernetes cluster environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads container logs (
kubectl logs), Kubernetes resource definitions in YAML format (kubectl get -o yaml), and output from proxy admin API requests. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or boundary markers to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read cluster state, retrieve logs, execute commands inside pods (with user consent), and trigger workload rollouts (with user consent).
- Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the content of the logs or resource metadata before the agent processes them.
Audit Metadata