k8s-velero-troubleshooting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the Kubernetes API and container logs (e.g., kubectl get, kubectl logs).
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of kubectl get (object statuses, failure reasons, messages) and kubectl logs from the Velero server and node-agent pods (SKILL.md, steps 1, 2, 4, 5).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the ingested data, but it restricts investigation to specific fields using jsonpath.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses write capabilities through kubectl patch, kubectl annotate, and kubectl apply (SKILL.md, 'Proposed fix' section; references/volume-data.md, 'Proposed fix' section).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is defined, relying on the agent's interpretation of the structured Kubernetes output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses kubectl commands for investigation and remediation. The remediation commands are clearly marked with 'Proposed fix' or 'Ask first' headers to ensure human oversight before execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 10:57 PM