format-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runcalls across multiple files (core/input_conversion.py,core/field_refresh.py,core/render.py) to invoke system binaries such assoffice(LibreOffice),winword.exe(Microsoft Word),wps.exe, and font management tools likefc-list. These are used for converting legacy formats to.docx, refreshing document fields, and rendering pages for inspection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In
core/llm.py, the_upload_imagefunction transmits file data to public domains includinglitterbox.catbox.moe,catbox.moe, and0x0.st. This capability is used to host document snapshots when a multi-modal LLM endpoint does not support direct base64 uploads. While this is gated by theLLM_ALLOW_PUBLIC_IMAGE_UPLOADenvironment variable and documented in.env.example, it represents a high risk of data exposure for sensitive documents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied Word documents and interpolates extracted text into prompts sent to the LLM for role labeling.
- Ingestion points:
core/extract.pyreads content from all document stories including body, textboxes, and comments. - Boundary markers: While the prompt template in
core/label_roles.pyprovides structure, the ingested paragraph text is inserted directly into the JSON-formatted payload without specialized sanitization. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including shell command execution and network access, which could be abused if an injected document successfully influences the agent's logic.
- Sanitization: No robust filtering or escaping of the ingested text is performed before it is sent to the model context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to external LLM providers and the aforementioned public file hosting services using the
requestslibrary.
Audit Metadata