agent-delegation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides tools to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host via the shell runtime. These commands are executed in detached tmux sessions, allowing for long-running background processes that are not immediately visible in the primary terminal interface.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The shell runtime and harnesses feature execute user-supplied strings directly using bash -lc and eval. The skill documentation for SKILL.md and references/safety-rules.md explicitly states there is no sandboxing or isolation for these inputs, making the system vulnerable to executing malicious code if it processes instructions from untrusted sources.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external agent CLIs (claude, codex, pi) that must be pre-installed on the host. These tools facilitate remote interactions with AI providers and are executed as sub-processes by this skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The spawn_agent tool acts as a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection as defined in Category 8. It ingests a prompt string without boundary markers or sanitization and has the capability to perform unrestricted file system and shell operations through its various runtimes.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: According to references/runtime-contract.md, the execution process involves writing a launcher script to the host's filesystem at $ADM_STATE_DIR/launchers/ and then executing it. This dynamic script generation and execution pattern increases the risk of local command injection or modification of the execution flow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 18, 2026, 07:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-delegation