color-grading

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the subprocess module to run media processing scripts from a local ffmpeg-skill installation.
  • This execution is restricted to a hardcoded list of allowed vendor scripts (probe.py, color.py, look.py, and check.py).
  • Command-line arguments are constructed from validated types (numbers, enums, and absolute paths) rather than raw request strings.
  • The skill explicitly rejects input fields named command, exec, shell, argv, or script at any nesting depth to prevent argument injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted JSON request documents defining video projects.
  • Ingestion points: JSON data is read from stdin in src/color_grading/cli.py and parsed by model.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill enforces a rigorous JSON schema with structural and semantic validation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read/write local files and execute specific processing tools.
  • Sanitization: All creative and technical parameters (like exposure, contrast, and LUT paths) are checked against valid ranges, enums, and types before being used.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads media files and Look-Up Tables from the local filesystem.
  • It employs a PathPolicy class that resolves symlinks and checks all paths against configurable allowed_input_roots and allowed_lut_roots.
  • File system writes are strictly confined to a designated workspace directory.
  • Path traversal attempts (using ..) and unsafe filenames are systematically blocked.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 04:47 PM