color-grading
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to run media processing scripts from a localffmpeg-skillinstallation. - This execution is restricted to a hardcoded list of allowed vendor scripts (
probe.py,color.py,look.py, andcheck.py). - Command-line arguments are constructed from validated types (numbers, enums, and absolute paths) rather than raw request strings.
- The skill explicitly rejects input fields named
command,exec,shell,argv, orscriptat any nesting depth to prevent argument injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted JSON request documents defining video projects.
- Ingestion points: JSON data is read from stdin in
src/color_grading/cli.pyand parsed bymodel.py. - Boundary markers: The skill enforces a rigorous JSON schema with structural and semantic validation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read/write local files and execute specific processing tools.
- Sanitization: All creative and technical parameters (like exposure, contrast, and LUT paths) are checked against valid ranges, enums, and types before being used.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads media files and Look-Up Tables from the local filesystem.
- It employs a
PathPolicyclass that resolves symlinks and checks all paths against configurableallowed_input_rootsandallowed_lut_roots. - File system writes are strictly confined to a designated workspace directory.
- Path traversal attempts (using
..) and unsafe filenames are systematically blocked.
Audit Metadata