autoskill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the user's screen history (window titles and OCR text) via the local screenpipe API, which acts as an untrusted input source.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch_window.pyretrieves timeline events includingwindow_titleandtextfrom the local screenpipe HTTP service. - Boundary markers: The data is interpolated into the LLM prompt in
scripts/synthesize.pywithout strict delimiters, creating a surface where malicious content on a user's screen could attempt to influence the skill's logic. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write and directory-move capabilities (
scripts/run.py,scripts/promote.py) used for creating and installing new skills. - Sanitization:
scripts/redact.pyprovides defense-in-depth by scrubbing sensitive patterns (API keys, tokens, emails) from the screen data before it is sent to the LLM. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic imports and script generation as part of its core functionality.
- Evidence:
scripts/autoskill.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto load subcommand modules likerunat runtime. - Evidence:
scripts/run.pygenerates newSKILL.mdfiles based on LLM output. This is a standard behavior for this skill's purpose as the proposals are stored in a temporary directory for user review before being manually promoted.
Audit Metadata