gget
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests sequences and gene lists from external files, which could theoretically contain malicious instructions targeting the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points:
read_fastainscripts/batch_sequence_analysis.pyandread_gene_listinscripts/enrichment_pipeline.pyprocess user-provided FASTA and CSV/text files. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific boundary markers or instruction-ignoring warnings when processing this data.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities include extensive network access to bioinformatics APIs, local file system writes for results, and package installation via
gget setup. - Sanitization: The scripts validate biological formats but do not sanitize for potential prompt injection content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes setup commands for downloading large-scale scientific datasets and installing module-specific dependencies.
- Evidence:
gget setup alphafolddownloads approximately 4GB of model parameters, andgget setup cellxgeneinstalls necessary Python packages via pip/uv. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the local environment to manage dependencies and execute specialized bioinformatics binaries.
- Evidence: The
gget setupcommand utilizes package managers (piporuv) to install software, and modules likemuscleanddiamondinvoke external alignment tools.
Audit Metadata