grpo-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
examples/reward_functions_library.pyincludes arun_test_casesfunction that callsexec()on strings extracted from the model's own completions. Executing AI-generated code at runtime is a critical vulnerability because LLM outputs are untrusted and could contain malicious logic or commands designed to compromise the host system. While the code contains a warning about the need for sandboxing, the provided implementation directly executes the untrusted code in the current process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture involves processing external datasets and model generations, which creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: External training data loaded via
datasets.load_datasetand completions generated by the model during training. 2. Boundary markers: The skill uses XML tags for structure, but lacks security-focused delimiters to separate instructions from data. 3. Capability inventory: The training process includes a high-risk capability via theexec()function in the reward library. 4. Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization of model outputs before execution, relying only on basic pattern matching.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata