hugging-science
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches catalog data from the external domain
huggingscience.co, which could potentially contain malicious instructions embedded in dataset or model descriptions. - Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch_catalog.pyfetches markdown files from the remote catalog. - Boundary markers: The script prepends an
UNTRUSTED_BANNERto fetched content to warn the agent that the data is third-party and not authoritative instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of network requests, file system access, and model execution via libraries like
transformersandgradio_client. - Sanitization: The
_defangfunction inscripts/fetch_catalog.pystrips markdown code fences (```) and frontmatter delimiters (---) from the fetched text to prevent the agent from misinterpreting data as executable blocks or system configuration. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the use of models from the Hugging Face Hub that may require the execution of custom modeling code.
- Evidence:
references/using-models.mdexplicitly discusses the use of thetrust_remote_code=Trueflag for architectures like Evo-2 and various genomics models. - Mitigation: The skill mandates that the agent must inform the user about the implications of this flag and request explicit consent before proceeding, treating the repository as an untrusted source until confirmed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/fetch_catalog.pyutility programmatically retrieves resource lists fromhttps://huggingscience.co, which is the dedicated domain for this catalog.
Audit Metadata